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POPULARITY FUNCTIONS, PARTISAN EFFECTS,
AND SUPPORT IN PARLIAMENT
FRANCISCO JOSE´ VEIGA AND LINDA GONC¸ALVES VEIGA
This paper analyzes the popularity of the main political entities in
Portugal. Estimation results of popularity functions validate the
responsibility hypothesis, with unemployment, and to a lesser extent
inﬂation, affecting popularity levels. There is also evidence of person-
ality effects, of popularity erosion over consecutive terms and of honey-
moon effects. Finally, we found that voters’ evaluations of incumbents’
performance regarding unemployment is affected by their support in
Parliament – when an incumbent faces more opposition in Parliament,
voters are less likely to hold him responsible for unemployment
increases.
1. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH THE international literature on the inﬂuence of economic
conditions on the popularity of politicians and electoral results is extensive,
there is very little work on the Portuguese case.1 This paper tries to ﬁll that
gap in the literature by analyzing the main determinants of the popularity of
the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic, Government, Prime Minister, and
President, from May 1986 to October 1999.
We start by testing whether incumbents are held responsible for economic
outcomes (the responsibility hypothesis) in a model that permits the
existence of honeymoon effects, popularity depreciation over consecutive
terms in ofﬁce, and personality effects. Then we test if voters’ evaluations of
incumbents’ economic performances are affected by their support in
Parliament, hypothesizing that Governments enjoying weaker support in
Parliament would be penalized less for poor economic outcomes. Finally, we
account for partisan effects in our popularity functions, and investigate if
the way voters hold political entities responsible for economic outcomes
depends on the entities’ ideological orientations. Since shocks to the
popularity of the four political entities are likely to be correlated, we
estimate a system of popularity functions using the seemingly unrelated
regressions method with autoregressive components.
Corresponding author: Francisco Jose´ Veiga, Escola de Economia e Gesta˜o, Universidade
do Minho, P-4710-057 Braga – Portugal. Phone: þ 351-253604534; fax: þ 351-253676375;
e-mail: fjveiga@eeg.uminho.pt
1Seminal papers are Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Kramer (1971), and Mueller (1970). See
Lewis-Beck (1988) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994) for surveys on the topic. One notable
exception for Portugal is Veiga (1998).
Sections 2 and 3 describe the evolution and structure of the Portuguese
political system in order to provide some background to the analyses
performed. Section 4 presents the dataset used in the paper and the empirical
results are reported in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2. THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SYSTEM SINCE APRIL 25, 19742
In a bloodless coup on April 25, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement
(Movimento das Forc¸as Armadas – MFA), a group of mainly left-wing
military ofﬁcers, seized power and put an end to the so-called New State
(Estado Novo), an authoritarian regime that had lasted 48 years. In the
following two years there was considerable turmoil in the Portuguese
political system. Initially, the country was run by the Junta of National
Salvation (which was replaced by the Council of the Revolution in March
1975), but there then followed six temporary Governments and two
Presidents. Over this period, independence was given to the African Over-
seas Territories, and two military uprisings took place (in March and November
1975). Elections for the Constituent Assembly, that would prepare and
approve a new constitution, were held in April 1975.
The new constitution came into effect on April 25, 1976, and elections for
the Assembly of the Republic, the Portuguese unicameral Parliament, were
held on the same day. Two months later, on June 27, General Ramalho
Eanes, an independent military candidate, was elected President of the
Republic. He then invested a minority Government led by Ma´rio Soares, the
leader of the socialist party, on July 16. Eleven years of great political
instability followed, during which 10 minority and coalition Governments
failed before completing their terms, and ﬁve legislative elections took place.
After two terms of Ramalho Eanes as President of the Republic, Ma´rio
Soares won the second runoff of a disputed Presidential election (on
February 16, 1986), and became the ﬁrst civilian head of state in 60 years.
On July 19, 1987, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) became the ﬁrst
political party in the 13 years since the fall of dictatorship to win an absolute
majority of seats in Parliament. Cavaco Silva, who had led a minority
Government in the two previous years, was able to form an all-PSD
Government, and became the ﬁrst Prime Minister since 1974 to complete his
term. He was then re-elected by an overall majority of the electorate in
October 1991, and ruled the country for another four years.
Economic recession and scandals involving members of Government led
to a growing erosion of the Government’s popularity, which prompted
Cavaco Silva to abandon the leadership of PSD in January 1995, and
prepare his bid for the Presidency. The Socialist Party (PS) won the October
2For a more complete description of the evolution and structure of the Portuguese political
system, see Magone (1997) and several issues of Arthur Banks’s Political Handbook of the
World and of the World Europa Yearbook.
1995 elections, coming very close to achieving an overall majority in
Parliament (112 of a total of 230 deputies), and Anto´nio Guterres became
Prime Minister. Three months later, Jorge Sampaio, former mayor of
Lisbon and candidate of the socialist party, won the Presidential elections
against Cavaco Silva.
For the ﬁrst time since 1974, a minority Government managed to stay in
power for the entire term. The legislative elections of October 10, 1999, were
again won by the socialists, who got exactly half of the seats in Parliament.
In January 2001, Jorge Sampaio was elected for a second term as President.
The disappointing results of the socialists in the municipal elections of
December 2001 led to the resignation of Anto´nio Guterres and his
government, which prompted the President to dissolve the Parliament
and call for new legislative elections in March 2002. These were won by
PSD, which controls 46 percent of the seats in Parliament, and formed a
coalition Government with the Social Democratic Center/People’s Party
(CDS/PP).
3. STRUCTURE OF THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SYSTEM
Since the constitutional revision of 1982 that eliminated the Council of the
Revolution, the organs of sovereignty in Portugal are the President of the
Republic, the Assembly of the Republic, the Government, and the Courts.
The President of the Republic is directly elected for a ﬁve-year term via a
secret ballot with universal adult suffrage. There is a second-round runoff
TABLE 1 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS AND PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT
Dates of elections
Winning
party or
coalition
Share in
Parliament
(%) Prime Minister Form of Government
April 25, 1976 PS 43 Ma´rio Soares One party, minority
December 2, 1979 AD¼PSD
þCDSþPPM
51 Sa´ Carneiro Coalition (AD)
October 5, 1980 AD¼PSD
þCDSþPPM
54 Sa´ Carneiro Coalition (AD)
April 25, 1983 PS 40 Ma´rio Soares Coalition (PSþPSD)
October 5, 1985 PSD 34 Cavaco Silva One party, minority
July 19, 1987 PSD 59 Cavaco Silva One party
October 6, 1991 PSD 58 Cavaco Silva One party
October 1, 1995 PS 48 Anto´nio Guterres One party, minority
October 10, 1999 PS 50 Anto´nio Guterres One party, ‘‘minority’’
March 17, 2002 PSD 46 Dura˜o Barroso Coalition (PSDþCDS/PP)
Note: PS – Socialist Party (center left); PSD – Social Democratic Party (center right); CDS/PP
– Social Democratic Center/People’s Party (right); PPM – Monarchic Popular Party (right,
monarchic).
between the two top vote-getters if none of the contenders receives a
majority of the votes in the ﬁrst round. Presidential candidates must be
Portuguese citizens, aged 35 or over. They can either run as independents, or
be the appointed candidate of a political party. No President can serve for
more than two consecutive terms.
The main duties of the President are: to serve as the head of State and the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; to set the dates of legislative
elections after consulting the parties; to appoint the Prime Minister and the
members of the Government suggested by the latter; to dissolve the Parliament
and call for elections; and to promulgate and have published laws, decree-
laws, and regulations. The President also has the power to veto laws and
decrees, or to send them for consideration by the Constitutional Tribunal.
The Assembly of the Republic is the Portuguese unicameral Parliament,
currently composed of 230 deputies elected for a period of four years by
direct and secret universal adult suffrage, using a proportional electoral
system. The duties of the Assembly include (among others): enacting
legislation in all areas except those reserved to the Government; approving
amendments to the Constitution; approving the Government’s general
budget and plan of activities; passing motions of conﬁdence or censure to
the Government; and appointing 10 of the 13 members of the Constitutional
Tribunal.
The Government consists of the Prime Minister (generally the leader of
the party that received the most votes in the last elections), the Ministers, the
Secretaries of State, and the Under-Secretaries of State. No member of
Government can serve as deputy in the Assembly of the Republic at the
same time. The President usually consults the political parties, and takes
into account recent election results, when appointing or dismissing a Prime
Minister. The other members of the Government are appointed by the
President at the proposal of the Prime Minister.
The Government formulates the general policy of the country and is the
highest organ of public administration. It therefore has political, legislative,
and executive powers. Its legislative power consists of proposing laws to the
TABLE 2 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Dates of elections President (major opponent)
June 27, 1976 General Ramalho Eanes (Otelo S. de Carvalho)
December 10, 1980 General Ramalho Eanes (Soares Carneiro)
January 26 and February 16, 1986 Ma´rio Soares (Freitas do Amaral)
January 13, 1991 Ma´rio Soares (Bası´lio Horta)
January 14, 1996 Jorge Sampaio (Cavaco Silva)
January 14, 2001 Jorge Sampaio (Ferreira do Amaral)
Assembly and issuing decrees.3 Its executive power extends to the execution
of the general plans of activities and budgets of the State. The Government
is responsible to both the President, who can dismiss it, and to the Assembly
of the Republic, which must approve its plans and budgets and may dismiss
it by passing a censure motion.
Since the Government is responsible for the conduct of economic policy,4
we expect it to be the organ of sovereignty whose popularity depends most
upon the performance of the Portuguese economy. The popularity of the
Prime Minister, the head of Government, is likely to be next in sensitivity to
economic performance. Because the Assembly is usually dominated by the
party in Government and approves the laws, plans, and budgets proposed
by the latter, it may also be held responsible for the performance of the
economy. Finally, the President can only veto the laws or decrees proposed
by the Government, or dismiss it. Thus, we would expect the popularity of
the President to be the least affected by economic performance.
Taking into account the evolution of the political system described in the
previous section and the increasing inﬂuence of the European Union on
domestic policies, especially on monetary issues, we expect the way voters
hold national political entities responsible for economic conditions to vary
over time.
4. THE DATA
The period analyzed in this paper begins in May 1986 and ends in October
1999. This period includes three terms of social democratic Governments
and a term of a socialist Government. Popularity data are available from a
weekly national journal called Expresso. Euroexpansa˜o conducts the polls
on a monthly basis, by telephone interviews to a representative sample of
about 600 Portuguese adults. The respondents are asked to classify the
performance of the Prime Minister, the Government, the Assembly of the
Republic, and the President of the Republic as very good (VG), fairly good
(FG), or bad (B). We calculate a popularity index, POPt, for each of the four
entities, where the index is a weighted sum of the percentages responding
very good and fairly good. Speciﬁcally, the index is deﬁned as
POPt ¼ (2*VGtþFGt)/2. The values of the index over the period studied
are shown in Figure 1.
3Since the most important areas of legislation are reserved to the Assembly of the Republic,
the Government is allowed to produce decrees concerning its organization and functioning
and less important matters. The Assembly can also authorize the Government to legislate in
some areas of its competence.
4Concerning monetary policy, it should be stressed that before the Maastricht Treaty (signed
in December 1991), the Central Bank enjoyed very little independence. In fact, the Finance
Minister had great control over the Bank of Portugal and could at any time dismiss all members
of its Council of Governors. Thus, we can safely say that the Government controlled monetary
policy before 1992. In April 1992, the Portuguese escudo joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism
of the European Monetary System, practically putting an end to independent monetary policy.
Monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted and standardized, were
collected from OECD Main Economic Indicators. Inﬂation rates, nominal
exchange rates, real effective exchange rates, interest rates, and the
industrial production index were collected from the International Financial
Statistics data of the International Monetary Fund.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our popularity functions model support for incumbent politicians as a
function of economic and political variables. Economic variables are
included to test the responsibility hypothesis, which suggests that voters
hold politicians responsible for economic conditions. Several economic
series have been used in previous studies of popularity functions, but
unemployment and inﬂation are the most commonly used and have received
the greatest empirical support. The underlying idea is that the evolution of
these series affects the utility of voters, who therefore punish (or reward)
politicians for increases (or decreases) in unemployment and inﬂation.5 The
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Figure 1. Popularity index.
5Whether voters are forward-looking or backward-looking in their vote decisions will not be
an issue for the moment. For simplicity, we assume expectations to be based on competence
revealed by politicians in the past.
inﬂuence of political factors is typically taken into account by including
variables to control for the erosion of popularity over time in ofﬁce, or to
reﬂect honeymoon effects of the newly elected politician with the electorate
immediately after an election. It is also common to include dummy variables
to control for personality factors or special events.
The popularity functions we estimate are of the following form:
popt ¼ aþ bpopt1 þ dpt2 þ fut1 þ jzt þ et; ð1Þ
where the dependent variable, pop, is a popularity index for one of the four
political entities, u is the unemployment rate, p is the inﬂation rate, and z is
a vector of explanatory variables accounting for the Prime Minister or
President in ofﬁce, honeymoon effects, and consecutive terms in ofﬁce.
In our basic speciﬁcation, overall economic performance is captured by
the rates of inﬂation and unemployment.6 The economic variables were
always lagged because economic data are released with a time lag, in some
cases of a few months, making it impossible for the interviewed people to
know their current values. Plots of the annual inﬂation rate and of the
unemployment rate are presented in Figure 2.
Portugal had two Prime Ministers and two Presidents during the time
period considered here. It is possible that the popularity levels they enjoyed
depended partly on their personal characteristics. In order to account for
personal effects on the popularity of the political entities considered in the
paper, two dummy variables were included in the set of explanatory
variables [in vector z of equation (1)]. The ﬁrst, GUTERRES, takes the value
of one when Anto´nio Guterres is the Prime Minister, and zero otherwise. It
was included in the estimations for the Assembly, Government, and Prime
Minister. The second, SAMPAIO, takes the value of one when Jorge
Sampaio is the President of the Republic, and zero otherwise. It was
included in the estimations of the President’s popularity.
Honeymoon effects are captured by a discrete variable, Honeymoon,
which takes the value of six in the ﬁrst month of each term, declining to one
in the sixth month, and taking the value of zero thereafter. The hypothesis
being investigated is that politicians have higher popularity indices during
the ﬁrst months of their administration. Since longer time in ofﬁce is usually
associated with erosion of popularity, we expect negative coefﬁcients for the
dummy variables Term2 and Term3, representing the second and the third
terms in ofﬁce, when the dummy for the ﬁrst term is not included in the
estimation.
We ﬁrst estimated all four models using OLS. But the time-series struc-
ture of a series may be more appropriately addressed by applying the
6We also tested for the effects of the percentage changes of the industrial production index,
the nominal exchange rate (Portuguese escudos per US dollar), the real effective exchange rate,
and real interest rates.
Box–Jenkins methodology for model selection. Our ﬁrst step was to ﬁnd out
if the popularity indices of our four political entities followed ARIMA
processes. Since Dickey–Fuller and Phillips–Perron tests showed evidence of
stationarity for the popularity indices,7 these can only follow ARMA
processes. Autocorrelations and partial correlations of those series suggest
autoregressive processes for all indices.8 Because the popularity of the four
political entities analyzed is inﬂuenced by common factors and the residuals
of the estimations are correlated, it is more appropriate to estimate the four
equations as a system, using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
technique. Given this advantage of SUR over the other techniques, only its
results are shown in this paper.9
Finally, we tested for the importance of the incumbent’s support in
Parliament, for partisan effects, and for the inﬂuence of the entrance to the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System (in April
1992) or to the European Monetary Union (in January 1999) on the way
voters hold the political entities accountable for economic outcomes. That
was done by augmenting the model with interaction variables between the
economic variables and the dummy variables accounting for the above-
mentioned effects.
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Figure 2. Inﬂation and unemployment.
7The results of ADF and Phillips–Perron tests indicate that all variables used in the
estimations are stationary. This is very important, as classical OLS inference is invalid in the
presence of non-stationary variables. The ADF test statistics (using a constant and no trend)
of the dependent variables are: 3.87 (Assembly); 3.95 (Government); 2.88 (Prime
Minister); and 2.51 (President). The critical values for rejection of a unit root are: 3.47
(1 percent), 2.88 (5 percent), and 2.57 (10 percent). Although a unit root cannot be rejected
for the President’s popularity when using an ADF test, this hypothesis is rejected at a 1
percent signiﬁcance level when a Phillips–Perron test is used: the test statistic is 3.96 and the
critical value is 3.47. Given this strong result, we treated the President’s popularity as a
stationary series.
8Then we estimated an ARIMAX model that incorporated the explanatory variables used in
our OLS estimations.
9OLS and ARIMAX results are available from the authors upon request. Although in general
they are somewhat similar to SUR results, there are minor differences regarding the statistical
signiﬁcance of some variables.
5.1 SUR results
Results of SUR estimations are shown in Table 3. The coefﬁcients
associated with the dummy variables GUTERRES and SAMPAIO have
negative signs in the four estimations. They are statistically signiﬁcant in the
estimations for the Prime Minister and Government, showing that the
popularity of these two entities tended to be smaller when Anto´nio Guterres
was Prime Minister (a socialist Government was in ofﬁce). The same cannot
be said about the Assembly, whose popularity does not seem to depend on
the particular Prime Minister or the ideology of the Government in ofﬁce.
With respect to the President’s popularity, there is weak evidence that Jorge
Sampaio was less popular than Ma´rio Soares.
The coefﬁcients associated with the dummy variables that represent the
second and third terms in ofﬁce (Term2 and Term3, respectively) have a
negative sign, as expected, and are highly statistically signiﬁcant in all but
one occasion: Term2 is not signiﬁcant in the estimation for the Assembly.
This, together with a much smaller estimated coefﬁcient for Term3 (in
absolute terms), means that this political entity suffers less erosion of
popularity over consecutive terms in ofﬁce than the others.10 The results
support the existence of honeymoon effects for all entities except the
President. That is, the Assembly, the Government, and the Prime Minister
seem to enjoy a higher level of popularity in the beginning of their terms.
For the Assembly and, especially, for the Government, there is some
evidence that higher average inﬂation11 leads to lower popularity. The results
also show that higher rates of unemployment decrease the popularity of the
political entities considered. The estimated coefﬁcients have a negative sign,
as expected, and are statistically signiﬁcant in all estimations. Since Wald
tests reject the hypotheses of equal coefﬁcients for inﬂation and unemploy-
ment across the four political entities, we can say that Portuguese voters do
not hold these political entities equally responsible for economic outcomes.
The highly statistically signiﬁcant effect of unemployment on the
President’s popularity is somewhat surprising, given his very small power
over economic policy. We would expect his popularity to be the least
affected by economic conditions. These results may reﬂect citizens’ mis-
perception of the President’s powers, but we can also argue that voters
penalize the President for not vetoing laws and decrees that lead to ‘‘bad’’
economic policy/outcomes or for not dismissing an ‘‘incompetent’’
Government. This possibility of dismissing the Government (which was
used several times before 1985) gives the President some inﬂuence over the
10In the case of the Assembly, ‘‘consecutive terms in ofﬁce’’ means that the same party
dominated the Parliament over consecutive terms.
11The variable used to account for the effects of inﬂation on popularity levels is the
second lag of the four-month moving average of monthly inﬂation: AvInﬂationt¼
(Inftþ Inft1þ Inft2þ Inft3)/4. Other deﬁnitions of average inﬂation were tried, but results
remained essentially the same.
latter and may lead voters to feel that he can inﬂuence economic policy if he
exerts enough pressure on the Government.
The residual correlation matrix at the bottom of Table 3 indicates that
there is considerable correlation (always above 50 percent) between the error
terms for the equations for the Prime Minister, Government, and Assembly
of the Republic. The correlations of these equations’ residuals with that of
the President are smaller, but still around 20 percent. In order to ﬁnd out
whether these correlations are jointly signiﬁcantly different from zero, we
used Breush and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier test:
lLM ¼ T
XM
i¼2
Xi1
j¼1
r2ij; ð2Þ
where T is the number of observations,M is the number of equations, and rij
is the estimated correlation. Asymptotically, this statistic is distributed as
TABLE 3 SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS (SUR)
Assembly of
the Republic Government Prime Minister President
Constant 58.55 73.42 93.81 94.93
(18.66) (15.26) (17.41) (31.00)
GUTERRES 1.82 11.03 12.29
(1.12) (4.34) (4.26)
SAMPAIO 2.99
(1.94)
Term2 0.68 10.70 15.80 6.40
(0.45) (4.69) (6.21) (5.38)
Term3 5.35 17.07 22.69
(3.41) (6.71) (7.88)
Honeymoon 1.55 2.36 2.97 0.31
(5.79) (6.43) (7.36) (0.95)
AvInﬂation(2) 2.07 3.86 2.82 0.10
(1.70) (2.47) (1.63) (0.06)
UnempRate(1) 0.76 1.49 2.70 2.26
(2.25) (2.68) (4.31) (5.94)
Pop(1) 0.44 0.62 0.63 0.46
(8.12) (15.08) (15.24) (6.82)
Adjusted R-squared 0.62 0.79 0.84 0.63
Residual Correlation Matrix
Assembly 1.00 0.70 0.55 0.22
Government 0.70 1.00 0.68 0.20
Prime Minister 0.55 0.68 1.00 0.26
President 0.22 0.20 0.26 1.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the popularity index of the political entity shown in the column
heading. Monthly observations from May 1986 to October 1999. t-Statistics are in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 1%, 5%, and 10%.
chi-squared with M(M1)/2 degrees of freedom and is based on OLS
residuals (see Greene, 2000, p. 621). Since this test clearly rejected the
hypothesis that the contemporaneous covariance matrix is diagonal,12 we
can safely argue that it was appropriate, and more efﬁcient, to estimate the
equations as a system, by SUR.
5.2 Other Results13
According to Anderson (2000) and Powell and Whitten (1993), evaluations of
the political entities’ performance should take into account their power and
responsibility over economic policy. That is, political entities with greater
authority to set economic policy should be those most accountable for
economic outcomes. Then Governments that are not supported by a majority
of seats in Parliament should be less accountable than those that are, since
lapses in performance can be blamed on actions taken by the opposition.
We tested the hypothesis that the political entities are less accountable for
economic outcomes when they do not enjoy the support of a majority of
deputies in the Parliament. That was done by interacting average inﬂation
and the unemployment rate with dummy variables for minority-supported14
and majority-supported political entities. The estimated equation becomes:
popt ¼ aþ bpopt1 þ fGuterrest þ d1Term2þ d2Term3
þ ZHoneymoont þ jm1 MINORITY þ jM1 MAJORITY
 
pt2
þ jm2 MINORITY þ jM2 MAJORITY
 
ut1 þ et: ð3Þ
The results for the Assembly and the Prime Minister15 are shown in Table
4. The political entities seem to be penalized for higher inﬂation and
12The Lagrange multiplier statistic is 168.38, with six degrees of freedom. The 1 percent
critical value is 16.81, so the hypothesis that the contemporaneous residual covariance matrix
is diagonal is clearly rejected. Tests for each of the estimated correlations indicate that all
are signiﬁcantly different from zero.
13We also considered the robustness of our results to a number of speciﬁcation choices. First,
we used alternative weights in deﬁning the popularity index. Second, we allowed popularity to
deteriorate smoothly with time in ofﬁce (and not just over consecutive terms) by including an
independent variable measuring time in ofﬁce (in months). Third, we allowed for different
deﬁnitions of the honeymoon effects dummy, Honeymoon. Fourth, we used alternative
deﬁnitions of average inﬂation. Finally, we estimated speciﬁcations that added as independent
variables the monthly percentage change of the industrial production index, the nominal
exchange rate, the real interest rate, and the real effective exchange rate (both jointly, and one
at a time). None of these changes had an important effect on the previous results. These results
are available from the authors upon request.
14There were minority governments during the ﬁrst terms of Cavaco Silva (October 1985
to July 1987) and Anto´nio Guterres (October 1995 to October 1999) as Prime Ministers.
15Since voters tend to see the Prime Minister and his Government as almost the same thing,
the estimations for the Government were not shown in Table 4 (the correlation between their
popularity indices is 94 percent). Furthermore, most results concerning the Government’s
popularity are very similar to those obtained for the Prime Minister. The equation for the
President was dropped because of his little inﬂuence over economic policy.
unemployment only when they are supported by a majority of deputies in
Parliament. But Wald tests did not reject the hypothesis of equal coefﬁcients
for majorities and minorities regarding inﬂation.16 Thus, only the results
concerning the unemployment rate are consistent with the hypothesis that
TABLE 4 TESTS OF PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT AND PARTISAN EFFECTS
Parliamentary support effects Partisan effects
Assembly of
the Republic
Prime
Minister
Assembly of
the Republic
Prime
Minister
Constant 52.28 84.14 63.65 100.40
(12.74) (11.88) (18.75) (16.73)
GUTERRES (LEFT) 0.64 10.83 14.68 30.37
(0.37) (3.68) (3.40) (3.78)
Term2 9.11 0.33 1.57 16.99
(1.87) (0.04) (1.09) (6.64)
Term3 4.68 6.69 6.49 24.42
(0.92) (0.74) (4.44) (8.78)
Honeymoon 1.44 2.82 1.77 3.37
(4.79) (5.98) (6.97) (8.34)
AvInﬂation(2)*MINORITY 1.90 2.27
(0.87) (0.74)
AvInﬂation(2)*MAJORITY 2.62 3.65
(1.89) (1.82)
UnempRate(1)*MINORITY 0.06 1.38
(0.12) (1.50)
UnempRate(1)*MAJORITY 1.38 3.75
(3.07) (4.37)
AvInﬂation(2)*LEFT 1.25 4.07
(0.37) (0.84)
AvInﬂation(2)*RIGHT 2.95 3.65
(2.34) (1.95)
UnempRate(1)*LEFT 0.48 0.76
(0.99) (0.78)
UnempRate(1)*RIGHT 1.41 3.56
(3.74) (4.96)
Pop(1) 0.42 0.62 0.39 0.60
(7.33) (14.42) (6.84) (14.18)
Adjusted R-squared 0.63 0.84 0.64 0.84
Notes: The dependent variable is the popularity index of the political entity shown in the
column heading; the equations are estimated using SUR. Monthly observations from May 1986
to October 1999. t-Statistics are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level at which the null hypothesis is
rejected: 1%; 5%, and 10%.
16For the Assembly, the Wald test statistic was w2(1)¼ 0.085 ( p-value of 0.77). For the Prime
Minister, we got w2(1)¼ 0.157 ( p-value of 0.69). Thus, for both entities, the hypothesis of equal
coefﬁcients for MAJORITY*AvInﬂation(2) and MINORITY*AvInﬂation(2) cannot be
rejected.
the evaluations of the political entities’ performance takes into account their
power and responsibility over economic policy.17
The analysis performed above assumes that the electorate holds the
political entities responsible for higher inﬂation or unemployment in a way
that is independent of the entities’ political orientation. Although the
dummy variable GUTERRES also represents the left,18 a negative co-
efﬁcient would only mean that the left-wing-oriented political entities tended
to be less popular in general. Swank (1993) introduced partisan considera-
tions into popularity functions. Following Hibbs (1977), he assumed that
left-wing parties care more about unemployment and economic growth than
right-wing parties, which are more concerned with inﬂation.
Therefore, during recessions the demand for expansionary policies
increases, making left-wing proposals more attractive, and the reverse
occurs during expansions. Assuming that politicians and voters behave
optimally, left-wing parties lose support when inﬂation rises, unemployment
falls, or economic growth rises, while right-wing parties gain support from
these economic changes.
We tested this hypothesis by interacting average inﬂation and the
unemployment rate with dummy variables for the left and the right (LEFT
and RIGHT ). In this way, we separate the effects of inﬂation and un-
employment on the popularity of left- or right-wing-oriented political parties.
The estimated equation is:
popt ¼ aþ bpopt1 þ fGuterrest þ d1Term2þ d2Term3
þ ZHoneymoont þ jL1LEFT þ jR1RIGHT
 
pt2
þ jL2LEFT þ jR2RIGHT
 
ut1 þ et: ð4Þ
Results for the Assembly and Prime Minister presented in the last two
columns of Table 4 indicate that right-wing-oriented political entities are
penalized for higher inﬂation and unemployment in a way similar to the
general results of Table 3. Contrary to Swank’s hypothesis, they do not
beneﬁt from increases in inﬂation. The estimated coefﬁcients for left-wing
entities are not statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that they were not affected
by economic outcomes.19
It is worth mentioning that in our sample period the left always ruled as a
minority government, while the right ruled just 14 months as a minority and
eight years supported by a majority of seats in Parliament. The high
17Wald tests reject the hypothesis of equal coefﬁcients for unemployment: the test statistic for
the Assembly was w2(1)¼ 4.606 ( p-value of 0.03) and, for the Prime Minister, w2(1)¼ 3.547
( p-value of 0.059).
18In our sample, the socialist party is in power when Anto´nio Guterres is Prime Minister
(GUTERRES¼ 1) and the social democrats rule when he is not (GUTERRES¼ 0).
19But it should be noted that Wald tests do not reject equal coefﬁcients for the left and the
right regarding inﬂation.
correlation between the dummy variables LEFT and MINORITY (74.1
percent) may explain why the left does not seem to be held accountable for
economic outcomes and the right is penalized for both higher inﬂation and
unemployment. That is, in our sample it is difﬁcult to distinguish between a
parliamentary-strength effect and a partisan effect. For that reason, a truly
convincing test of the two hypotheses would require a longer time series,
with more governments, which is not available. Nevertheless, it is accurate
to conclude that our results are consistent with Powell and Whitten (1993),
but not with Swank (1993).20
6. CONCLUSIONS
Our estimates of linear popularity functions for Portugal are consistent with
the responsibility hypothesis: voters hold the four political entities under
investigation responsible for economic outcomes, especially unemployment.
Results are also consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of variations in
the unemployment rate on popularity is inﬂuenced by whether or not the
party in power has a majority of seats in the Assembly of the Republic. That
is, we ﬁnd that political entities supported by a majority of deputies are
penalized for higher unemployment, while those not enjoying that support
are not held accountable for economic outcomes. The lack of evidence of
partisan effects may result from the fact that, in our sample, the left always
ruled with minority governments, and the right ruled most of the time as a
majority government. That is, it is difﬁcult to distinguish between parlia-
mentary support and partisan effects. Overall, the Portuguese case is
consistent with the responsibility hypothesis and with Powell and Whitten’s
(1993) qualiﬁcation of popularity behavior, but not with Swank’s (1993).
Our data also suggest the existence of honeymoon effects and of
popularity depreciation over consecutive terms in ofﬁce. In most of the
estimations, we ﬁnd that the popularity of the Government and of the Prime
Minister tended to be smaller when Anto´nio Guterres was Prime Minister (a
socialist Government was in ofﬁce) and that Jorge Sampaio was a less
popular President than Ma´rio Soares. Personality or party effects do not
generally affect the popularity of the Assembly.
20We also tested the hypothesis that the additional constraints on economic policy that
resulted from the entrance of the Portuguese escudo to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
of the European Monetary System, in April 1992, changed the way in which voters held the
political entities accountable for economic outcomes. This was done by including a dummy
variable, ERM, that takes the value of one after April 1992, and two interaction variables that
are the product of that dummy with the unemployment rate, ERM*UnempRate(1), and with
average inﬂation, ERM*AvInﬂation(2). The same procedure was used to test a similar
hypothesis about the entrance to EMU, in January 1999. In both cases, there is no evidence that
the voters’ evaluation of the political entities changed after those events. These results are
available upon request.
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